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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -1952
that where proper bond has not been given a court is without jurisdiction
to punish for contempt. However, the court's power to punish is "inherent"
and, although subject to such legislative restriction as may be imposed, "no
&statute requires the giving of a new, additional or supplemental bond upon
modification of an injunction." The original injunction remained as modi-
fied and the bond remained in full force and effect. The opinion gives no
clear basis for distinguishing between a "modified" injunction and a "new"
one.
The ancient equitable doctrine of "dean hands" was a part of the de-
cision in Hasselschwert v. Hasselschwert. The plaintiff alleged that her
husband, the defendant, persuaded her that she was about to be sued and
should turn over to him certain real and personal property. Later, the
defendant threatened to kill her if she contested his divorce action or sought
to recover her property. Now she seeks that recovery. The court of ap-
peals held that the case presented an exception to the general rule that a
grantor who disposes of property with the intent to defraud creditors cannot
recover it Because undue influence was exercised on the plaintiff and
because of the confidential relationship existing between the parties (the
court cited Ohio General Code Section 7999) the plaintiff-grantor may re-
cover. The defendant cannot use the plaintiff's intent to defraud creditors to
establish "unclean hands" as a defense in order to permit hun "to retain
property which, in good conscience, belongs to the plaintiff."
EDGAR I. KING
EVIDENCE
Appeal and Error: Sufficiency of Evidence to Justify Conviction
In State v. Urbayti:u the defendant was convicted-for embezzlement of
funds of his ward. The defendant had waived a jury and was tried by the
court The supreme court reaffirmed its previous decision to the effect
that it is not required to, and will not ordinarily, weigh the evidence, but
it will examine the entire record to ascertain whether the rule requiring
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been followed. Admitting
that a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the
jury, or for that of the trial court when it is also the trier of fact (as in this
case), a majority of the court nevertheless were of the opimon that an
examination of the entire record showed that the evidence against the ac-
cused did not reach "that high degree of probative force and certainty" which
the law requires to justify conviction. Judgment reversed and the cause
remanded to the trial court with instruction to discharge the accused.
1156 Ohio St 271, 102 N.E.2d 248 (1951).
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Appeal and Error: Two-Issue Rule
In P14S V. Hoimes Constructgont Co.2 the court held that the Two-Issue
Rule is not applicable where the errors committed by the trial court are of
such a nature that they affect all the issues involved.
Blood-Grouping Tests
In State ex rel. Freeman v. Morris3 the question of the admissibility of
evidence of the results of blood-grouping tests to establish the paternity of
the defendant in a bastardy proceeding was considered for the first time
by the court. The complainant charged the defendant with being the
father of her child. Evidence of the results of blood-grouping tests of the
complainant, child and the defendant were admitted in evidence over the
objection of the defendant. These tests tended to show that the defendant
could be the father of the child. A qualified pathologist, over objection of
the defendant, also was permitted to testify at length as to the results of
these tests. The jury found the defendant to be the father. The court of
appeals affirmed. In reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, the
supreme court held that the results of blood-grouping tests which do not
establish non-paternity of the defendant, but which disclose a mere possi-
bility of his paternity, are not admissible in evidence in a bastardy proceed-
ing. Sections 12122-1 and 12122-2 of the Ohio General Code authorize
such evidence only when the results of the blood-grouping tests establish
'non-paternity.4 For like reasons, the testimony of the pathologist should
have been excluded.
In State v. Snyd&rs the cause originated in the Juvenile Court of Summit
County as a prosecution for non-support of minor children. The accused
filed a motion seeking an order requiring the prosecuting witness, the two
children and the accused to submit to blood-grouping tests. The motion
was overruled. The accused was thereupon tried and found guilty.
In the trial of the case, over objection of the accused, the state introduced
in evidence the record of a judgment previously entered in action in which
the plaintiff was the present complainant and the defendant was the ac-
cused herein and in which the court granted the plaintiff a divorce from the
defendant. This record contained a finding that the two children were
2 157 Ohio St. 95, 104 N.E.2d 689 (1952).
" 156 Ohio St. 333, 102 N.E.2d 450 (1951).
'In State ex tel. Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305, 58 N.E.2d 773 (1944), the
court held that the results of blood-grouping tests which exclude paternity are not
conclusive, but are merely further evidence to be considered by the jury. The high-
est court of Maryland has taken judicial notice that such tests are scientifically ac-
curate. Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945). Courts in two recent
cases regard them as conclusive. Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670
(1949); C. v. C., 200 Misc. 351, 109 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1951).
'157 Ohio St. 15, 104 N.E.2d 169 (1952).
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born as the issue of the marriage and an order that the defendant pay $15 per
week for their support. The accused testified as a witness in his own be-
half in the present action and offered evidence tending to show his non-
paternity. The trial court rejected such evidence for the reason that his
paternity had been established in the divorce action and that the judgment
in that action "... was in effect res ludicata of the question of the obligation
to support the children; .. "
The supreme court, however, following the well-established rule that the
record of a judgment in a civil action is not admissible in a criminal prose-
cution to prove the facts essential to a convicuon, held that the state was re-
quired to show that the accused came within the class of persons charged
by statute with the duty to support and, further, that it was the right of the
accused to offer evidence to prove that he did not come within that class
by showing that he was in fact not the father of the children, in spite of the
judgment in the earlier action for divorce. It was, therefore, prejudicial
error for the trial court to refuse to permit the accused to present evidence
tending to show he was not the father, and particularly in overruling his
motion for an order of the court requiring blood-grouping tests in accord-
ance with the provisions of Section 1639-46 of the Ohio General Code.7
Competency of Child Witness
In State v. Wilsone the defendant was charged with sexual offenses
against two girls each nine years of age. The defendant pleaded not guilty,
waived trial by jury and elected to be tried by the court. The prosecuting
attorney procured a commission authorizing the taking of the deposition
of one of the children since she was about to leave the country with her
parents. Before taking her testimony, the child was sworn by the com-
missioner in the usual way. The prosecuting attorney and counsel for
the defendant then questioned the child as to her understanding of the
meaning and significance of an oath. Her answers were recorded as part of
her testimony. While this examination was in progress, the proceedings
were adjourned'to allow the prosecuting attorney to request the presiding
judge of the court, in which the case was pending, to determine the child's
competency as awitness. The presiding judge ruled that he had no authority
to pass on the question, and that the trial judge would have to determine it
from the answers contained in the deposition. At the trial, the deposition
was admitted in evidence over the objection of the defendant. He was
convicted. On appeal, judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
It should be noted that the trial judge, who in this case was also the
eld. at 19, 104 N.E.2d at 171.
"See note 2 sxpra.
a 156 Ohio S. 525, 103 N.E.2d 552 (1952).
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trier of fact, had no opportunity to observe the child's appearance, her fear
or composure, her demeanor and manner of answering. The supreme court
held that these important observations are indispensable to a proper de-
termination of the competency of the child and that the answers given by
the child' and reported in the deposition did not satisfy the requirements of
Section 11493 of the Ohio General Code.
It is not dear what the supreme court meant when it said: " it is the
duty of the trial judge to immediately examine the child, without partcipa-
tion or interference of counsel. "0 It is universally held that the com-
petency of a witness is a question for the court alone, but it does not follow
that the preliminary examination of his qualifications may be conducted by
the trial judge himself, if he wishes, to the exclusion of the counsel for the
parties. Although there have been some general statements to this effect
by courts and text writers," the better, and modern, view is opposed to this
restriction upon counsel.12 Undoubtedly the trial judge has the right and
perhaps the duty to examine the witness, but he cannot deny the right of
counsel also to interrogate the witness. 3
The procedure recommended by the court in a case where the deposition
of a child is taken seems questionable. The court said that if the deposition
of a child is to be taken in the usual way before a notary public or commis-
sioner outside the presence of the court, the child should first be taken be-
fore any one of the several judges of the court in which the case is pending
and there be examined as to her competency. It would seem to be reversible
error for any judge, in a criminal case, to conduct such a hearing in the
absence of the triers of fact (in the principal case, the judge who tried the
case) or of the accused. The evidence of the child should be given in the
presence of the triers of fact because it is most important that they should
hear the answers which the child gives and see her demeanor when she is
questioned by the court or by the counsel, for that enables them to come to
a conclusion as to what weight they should attach to her evidence. In Eng-
land, it has been held that it is reversible error for the court in a criminal
case to conduct the preliminary examination of a child, for the purpose of
testing her competency as a witness, in the absence of the jury or the ac-
cused.' 4
9 An interesting discussion of this problem is found in McCray v. Shapiro, 116
N.Y.S.2d 436 (City Ct. New York City 1952)
1 156 Ohio St. 525, 529, 103 N.E.2d 552, 555 (1952).
"Carter v. State, 63 Ala. 52 (1879); Hughes v. G.H.&M. Ry., 65 Mich. 10, 31
N.W 603 (1887); State v. Michael, 37 W Va. 565, 16 S.E. 803 (1893). See
1 RICE, LAW oF EvDENcE § 263h (1894)
"See 6 WGMORE, EvIDENcE 299 (3d ed. 1940) and cases cited in note 2 therein.
"Munci v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 155, 213 S.W.2d 1019 (1948).
[spring
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -1952
Discovery
In Banks v. Canton Hardware Co.15 the plaintiff sought an accounting
for commissions allegedly earned by hun while employed by the defendant
as a traveling salesman. The plaintiff filed an affidavit under the authority
of Ohio General Code Section 11552 in which he stated that the defendant
had refused to permit hun to inspect and copy certain documents and records
pertaining to the plaintiff's sales, and further stating, but without any
supporting facts or data whatever, that on the sales actually made by him
he was entitled to commissions in the total sum of $2500. At the trial, over
objection of the defendant, the affidavit was admitted in evidence and the
court charged the jury that if it found that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover, it was to presume that his commissions amounted to $2500. The
supreme court held this was reversible error. The affidavit was insufficient
in that it alleged only a general conclusion to which the documents might
lead, with no allegation as to the contents of the documents themselves. If
the plaintiff had stated in his affidavit a r6sum6 of what orders he took, what
type of merchandise was involved, what was the price, or other information
showing his sales from which the new profits to the defendant could be
calculcated, such affidavit would be admissible in evidence and presumed to
be correct even though it would not have stated the exact contents of the
destroyed documents. Stewart, J., said: "It would seem a fantastically
foolish dng to allow a jury to presume an estimate of damages to be cor-
rect where no facts are given to support that estimate. In such a case the
one making the affidavit could name any figure, however ridiculous, as hIs
estimate of the amount due hin and the jury would have to return a verdict
for that amount. The mere statement of this proposition demonstrates its
absurdity."1
Impeachment of the Jury's Verdict
In Hutchinson v. Laughlin,17 an action for damages for the wrongful
death of the plaintiff's decedent resulting from the alleged malpractice of
the defendant, a surgeon, a verdict was rendered for the defendant by nine
of the twelve jurors. At the hearing of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial,
the foreman, who had signed the verdict, and two of the three jurors who
had failed to sign, appeared as witnesses, at the instance of the plaintiff, for
the purpose of establishing misconduct of the jury and irregularity in the
proceedings. Their testimony showed that the foreman had investigated
"R. v. Reynolds, [1950] 1 K.B. 606; R. v. Dunne, 99 L.JY..B. 117 (Ct. Cr. App.
1930).
' 156 Ohio St. 453, 103 N.E.2d 568 (1952).
" id. at 461, 103 N.E.2d at 573.
"T90 Ohio App. 5, 102 N.E.2d 875 (1951).
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